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ABSTRACT 
  Increasingly, courts must decide whether U.S. law applies 
extraterritorially. Courts largely resolve questions of extraterritorial 
scope using tools of statutory construction. Of these tools, the 
presumption against extraterritoriality has been ascendant. However, 
this presumption is subject to two divergent lines of cases: Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank Ltd. affirmed the strict operation of the 
presumption in civil cases, but United States v. Bowman continues to 
govern the presumption’s looser role in criminal cases, thereby 
creating a doctrinal asymmetry. This Note furthers the argument that 
courts should reconcile Morrison and Bowman, by laying out three 
arguments for why an expansive Bowman exception is problematic 
and unsustainable. First, the two lines of cases create unjustified 
doctrinal incoherencies, given the interrelated contexts in which the 
presumption is applied and the rationales underlying the 
presumption. Second, an expansive exception to the presumption in 
criminal contexts undermines the smart allocation of authority 
between the branches of government. Finally, an expansive Bowman 
exception runs counter to the tradition of offering fair notice of 
criminal law’s prohibitions. This Note asserts that these arguments 
counsel for the abrogation or, at least, substantial narrowing of the 
Bowman exception, to harmonize it with Morrison’s stricter vision of 
the presumption against extraterritoriality. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Four men sailing to Brazil hatch a plot on the high seas to 
defraud their employer.1 An international civil servant solicits a bribe 
in Afghanistan.2 A father sexually abuses his daughter while traveling 
with her in Europe.3 A Liberian dictator’s son tortures Liberian and 
Sierra Leonean citizens suspected of opposing his father’s rule.4 Each 
of these actions is based on actual events, and each violates U.S. 
criminal law, although none was perpetrated within the United States’ 
territorial boundaries. Extraterritoriality describes the capacity of 
U.S. law to apply abroad, and, as the previous examples illustrate, it 
can have, as a feature of legislation, implications for criminal liability, 
national sovereignty, and international relations. 
Although the extension of national law outside national borders 
has existed for more than two hundred years,5 the practice of law is 
witnessing a resurgent invocation of extraterritorial legislation of both 
modern and historic vintage. The Alien Tort Statute (ATS),6 a statute 
originating in the eighteenth century and assigning federal courts 
jurisdiction to hear civil suits against aliens for violations of 
international law,7 has been the subject of argument and reargument 
at the Supreme Court regarding its application of the ATS to a 
corporation’s alleged support for violence in Africa.8 Meanwhile, the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 19779 (FCPA) languished in 
obscurity for a quarter-century before reemerging as a premier tool 
for punishing bribery of foreign officials,10 ensnaring the likes of Wal-
 
 1. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 95–96 (1922). 
 2. See United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 297 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 3. See United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 62 (2d Cir. 2011). 
 4. See United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 793–94 (11th Cir. 2010). 
 5. Cf. Schooner Exch. v. M‘Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 127 (1812) (“There is no 
instance of [a sovereign’s laws’] actual extra-territorial operation, except where by fiction of law 
it is supposed to be territorial, or at most where it exclusively operates upon its own subjects.”). 
 6. Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).  
 7. The ATS was originally enacted as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 
73, 77. 
 8. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1663 (2013). 
 9. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m, 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff (2012).  
 10. Mike Koehler, The Facade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 907, 909, 913 
(2010); see FCPA DIGEST: CASES AND REVIEW RELEASES RELATING TO BRIBES TO FOREIGN 
OFFICIALS UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT OF 1977, at v, vii (Philip Urofsky 
et al. eds., 2012), available at http://shearman.symplicity.com/files/68c/68cf1e693fcaa
178acbd6d852a86b084.pdf (describing the dramatic increase in enforcement against individuals 
and companies in the last decade). 
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Mart Stores, Avon Products, and Siemens AG.11 Extraterritorial 
statutes can fulfill important functions in the nation’s legal regime—
such as achieving foreign policy goals, or closing off loopholes created 
by the ease of international travel and commerce—just as they can 
create risks that individuals and companies will be subject to 
conflicting legal obligations12 or that other states will be upset by the 
perceivable intrusion of U.S. legal norms within their own borders.13 
Although there is no dispute regarding Congress’s constitutional 
competence to legislate beyond the nation’s borders,14 there are 
serious consequences to such extraterritorial prescription, prompting 
judicial inquiry into whether Congress intended a law to have far-
reaching geographical scope. Courts look to the language of the 
statute for manifestations of such intent.15 Yet, when a court must 
construe a geoambiguous statute—that is, one lacking a clear 
indication of geographical scope16—it invokes the presumption 
against extraterritoriality. This judicial rule of interpretation 
construes the lack of express extraterritorial scope as a presumptive 
indication that Congress intended the statute’s prescriptions to be 
applicable only to domestic activity.17 
Nevertheless, the approach to applying this statutory canon is 
not monolithic; rather, two lines of jurisprudence govern the 
determination of extraterritoriality. The first line of cases—refined in 
2010 by Morrison v. National Australia Bank Ltd.18 and discussed in 
 
 11. Leslie Wayne, Hits, and Misses, in a War on Bribery, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2012, at 
BU1. 
 12. Cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 798 (1993) (holding that a court’s 
refusal to apply domestic law abroad, on the basis of international comity, requires a finding of 
“true conflict” between national and foreign legislation). But see id. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(eschewing the Hartford majority’s true-conflict approach and invoking, instead, a less stringent, 
multifactor analysis based on statutory construction and directed at the “reasonableness” of the 
legislature’s prescriptive jurisdiction). 
 13. See Joseph P. Griffin, Foreign Governmental Reactions to U.S. Assertions of 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 505, 505–06 (1998) (summarizing the 
legislative and diplomatic reactions to the international reach of U.S. antitrust laws). 
 14. See infra Part I. 
 15. See infra Part II.  
 16. See Jeffrey A. Meyer, Dual Illegality and Geoambiguous Law: A New Rule for 
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Law, 95 MINN. L. REV. 110, 114 (2010) (“‘[G]eoambiguous’ 
laws . . . proscribe or regulate conduct but . . . remain silent about whether they apply to acts 
that occur outside of the United States.”). 
 17. EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
 18. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010). 
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Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.19—embodies the general rule of 
strictly constraining statutes to domestic application, absent clear and 
contrary language.20 The second line of cases—descending from 
United States v. Bowman21—employs an “exception” to this general 
rule for certain classes of criminal offenses.22 These two cases and 
their progeny stand in uneasy juxtaposition and evince conflicting 
principles.23 
This Note argues in four Parts that, for reasons of doctrinal 
coherence, smart allocation of governmental authority, and fair 
notice, the lax Bowman exception should be substantially narrowed 
or eliminated.24 In terms of the two lines of cases that supposedly 
form a common doctrine, Morrison’s bright-line rule and Bowman’s 
porous standard are conceptually and practically incoherent, 
especially when they collide, for example, in the context of a statute 
that imposes criminal and civil liability. Likewise, the asymmetry that 
courts currently tolerate runs counter to constitutional guidance and 
prudential considerations as to the allocation of governmental 
authority and fair notice. With that in mind, Part I discusses the legal 
foundation for Congress’s authority to enact laws with extraterritorial 
effect. Part II, then, describes how courts have used the presumption 
against extraterritoriality to limit the scope of civil and criminal 
statutes, respectively, when Congress has not clearly indicated the 
statutes’ geographic reach. In Part III, this Note explains how 
Morrison recharacterized and refined courts’ use of the presumption 
in civil contexts, and how courts have refused to extend Morrison’s 
holding to criminal cases. Then, in Part IV.A, it examines the 
recognized rationales behind the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and, in Part IV.B, advocates on that basis that 
principles of doctrinal coherence, smart allocation of authority, and 
fair notice militate against perpetuation of the current asymmetries 
 
 19. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013). 
 20. See Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 248 (“It is a longstanding principle of American law 
‘that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply only within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.’” (quoting Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 282, 
285 (1949))). 
 21. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922). 
 22. Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 291 (1952). 
 23. See infra notes 124–27 and accompanying text. 
 24. This Note does not address whether conduct captured within the scope of 
geoambiguous criminal statutes is deserving of punishment. Conceptually, it is beyond the 
concerns of this Note. Practically, extraterritorial statutes are varied in substance, and such a 
topic would require more exacting treatment than this Note could give it. 
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created by the Bowman exception. Finally, Part IV.C introduces and, 
in turn, discounts two alternative proposals to the one advocated in 
this Note. 
I.  EXTRATERRITORIALITY: BOUNDED PRESCRIPTIVE AUTHORITY 
The U.S. Constitution and international law provide both for 
extraterritorial authority and ostensible constraints on its boundless 
exercise. The U.S. Constitution directly confers on Congress the 
authority to regulate extraterritorial activities in particular respects,25 
and the Supreme Court’s modern case law has recognized and 
repeatedly affirmed such extraterritorial authority.26 The inherent 
limits of the constitutional enumerations, affirmative due process 
restrictions, and deference to international law circumscribe the 
expansiveness of extraterritorial authority. However, none of these 
constitutional and international principles vigorously constrains 
Congress, given the lack of constitutional clarity and the dualistic 
approach to international law. 
The doctrine of enumerated powers structurally constrains the 
federal government’s extraterritorial authority just as it constrains its 
domestic authority.27 The enumerations that confer extraterritorial 
authority are the Define and Punish Clause,28 the Foreign Commerce 
 
 25. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cls. 3, 10, 18. 
 26. See, e.g., Hartford Fire Ins., Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 813–14 (1993) (“Congress 
has broad power under Article I, § 8, cl. 3, ‘[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign Nations,’ and 
this Court has repeatedly upheld its power to make laws applicable to persons or activities 
beyond our territorial boundaries where United States interests are affected.”); EEOC v. 
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“Congress has the authority to [extend the force 
of] its laws beyond the territorial boundaries of the United States.”). However, the Supreme 
Court was initially schizophrenic in its recognition of Congress’s extraterritorial authority. 
Compare Schooner Exch. v. M‘Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116, 127 (1812) (“There is no 
instance of [a sovereign’s laws’] actual extra-territorial operation, except where by fiction of law 
it is supposed to be territorial, or at most where it exclusively operates upon its own subjects.”), 
with Church v. Hubbart, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 187, 234–35 (1804) (“The authority of a nation within 
its own territory is absolute and exclusive. . . . [I]ts power to secure itself from injury, may 
certainly be exercised beyond the limits of its territory. . . . [Such exercise of power is acceptable 
when the means] are such as are reasonable and necessary to secure their laws from 
violation . . . .”).  
 27. See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. 94-166, 
EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 1–3 (2012) (situating 
federal authority among several discrete, enumerated powers). 
 28. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (granting Congress the power “[t]o define and punish 
Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations”). 
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Clause,29 and—supplementary to another enumeration—the 
Necessary and Proper Clause.30 Neither the Define and Punish Clause 
nor the Foreign Commerce Clause has received substantial judicial 
explication. Thus, whereas the Define and Punish Clause is limited by 
its own terms to acts that offend “the Law of Nations”31—
encompassing the expressly enumerated “Piracy and Felonies 
committed on the high Seas”32—the Supreme Court’s elucidation of 
the Clause’s scope has characterized “the Law of Nations” as 
international norms—generally accepted, specifically defined, and 
capable of development.33 Therefore, the universal crimes subject to 
its scope may be larger than the examples of the international acts 
specifically condemned in its text or even those condemned by 
international norms at the time of the Founding.34 The Foreign 
Commerce Clause has been, likewise, neglected by judicial 
examination.35 However, an analogy to the Domestic Commerce 
Clause is irresistible. Therefore, the principal restriction on the 
Foreign Commerce Power would likely be the condition that the 
regulated activity demonstrates a substantial effect on U.S. 
commerce.36 
 
 29. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (granting Congress the power “[t]o regulate Commerce with 
foreign Nations”). 
 30. See id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (granting Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or 
Officer thereof”). 
 31. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.  
 32. Id.; see also Anthony J. Colangelo, Constitutional Limits on Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: 
Terrorism and the Intersection of National and International Law, 48 HARVARD INT’L L.J. 121, 
137 (2007) (describing piracy as the “paramount offense against the law of nations at the time of 
the founding”).  
 33. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004) (bounding the scope of the ATS 
to “any claim based on the present-day law of nations . . . rest[ing] on a norm of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to the 
features of the 18th-century paradigms we have recognized”); see also Colangelo, supra note 32, 
at 137–38 (describing the ATS as derivative of Congress’s Define and Punish power and 
grounded on “an evolving body of norms”). 
 34. See Colangelo, supra note 32, at 139–42 (asserting that slavery is one such universally 
recognized offense and arguing that terrorism should be another). 
 35. See United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006) (“It is not so much that 
the contours of the Foreign Commerce Clause are crystal clear, but rather that their scope has 
yet to be subjected to judicial scrutiny.”); id. (“Cases involving the reach of the Foreign 
Commerce Clause vis-a-vis congressional authority to regulate our citizens’ conduct abroad are 
few and far between.”).  
 36. Colangelo, supra note 32, at 157. The constitutional threshold for invoking the Foreign 
Commerce Clause is at least as high as (and ostensibly higher than) the threshold for invoking 
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By comparison, the Necessary and Proper Clause may be the 
best understood of the three enumerations because its scope has been 
explored in the domestic context.37 The Necessary and Proper Clause 
confers augmentative authority to cure constitutional defects in 
enactments coming under the auspices of other substantive 
constitutional powers.38 Therefore, its relevance may arise in 
combination with either of the two constitutional provisions described 
above or others, such as those contained in the Taxing Clause, Treaty 
Clause, or Raising Armies Clause.39 Irrespective of the constitutional 
power that it augments, the Necessary and Proper Clause requires a 
“means-end fit[] between the legislation and the valid governmental 
objective.”40 
In contrast, due process is an affirmative constraint on 
congressional prescriptions, but courts have not provided a clear and 
consistent approach to effectuating due process limitations abroad.41 
Whereas U.S. citizens are entitled to due process protections, whether 
at home or abroad,42 aliens abroad have not been extended the few 
constitutional protections afforded to resident aliens in the United 
States.43 Neither have courts of appeals coalesced around a general 
 
the Domestic Commerce Clause; the former governs commerce “with foreign Nations,” 
whereas the latter derives from commerce “among the several States.” Id. at 147–48 (quoting 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3). 
 37. For key decisions construing the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause, see Nat’l 
Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585–93 (2012); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 
U.S. 1, 34–37 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring); and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316, 
421–23 (1819). 
 38. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2591 (“[T]he Clause gives Congress authority to ‘legislate on 
that vast mass of incidental powers which must be involved in the constitution’ . . . .” (quoting 
McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) at 411)). 
 39. DOYLE, supra note 27, at 3 nn.17–18. 
 40. Colangelo, supra note 32, at 152–53. 
 41. See DOYLE, supra note 27, at 5 (“[M]any of the cases do little more than note that due 
process restrictions mark the frontier of the authority to enact and enforce American law 
abroad.”). 
 42. J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. 
L.J. 463, 468 (2007). 
 43. Compare United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271 (1990) (enumerating 
the due process entitlements accorded to resident aliens), with id. at 269, 274–75 (refusing to 
extend the Fifth Amendment’s privileges to aliens located abroad or to make Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure protections applicable to aliens without voluntary connections 
to the United States). The exception may be due process protections accorded to aliens when 
prosecuted in an Article III court. See id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“[When] [t]he 
United States is prosecuting a foreign national in a court established under Article III, and all of 
the trial proceedings are governed by the Constitution[,] . . . the dictates of the Due Process 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment protect the defendant.”).  
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theory of extraterritorial due process rights,44 with some concluding 
that extraterritorial application of U.S. law must “not be arbitrary or 
fundamentally unfair”45 and others relying on other principles to limit 
prosecution of foreign actions.46 
Finally, international law indirectly constrains extraterritoriality. 
International law is not dispositive of the United States’ prescriptive 
authority.47 Legitimacy under international law is, however, a relevant 
consideration when interpreting U.S. statutes. Absent contrary 
legislative intent, courts presume that Congress has legislated in 
conformity with international law.48 Under international law, a state’s 
regulatory powers are classified according to one of three types of 
jurisdiction: prescriptive, adjudicatory, and enforcement.49 The 
Supreme Court has clarified that extraterritorial application of U.S. 
law is a function of prescriptive jurisdiction, rather than adjudicatory 
or enforcement jurisdiction.50 As a matter of prescriptive jurisdiction, 
the international legitimacy of a state’s prescriptive action is 
constrained, in turn, by the jurisdictional principles on which a state 
 
 44. See Colangelo, supra note 32, at 162 (“[C]ourts have created a confused and ad hoc 
jurisprudence in this area [of extraterritorial due process] with different Circuits espousing 
different requirements . . . .”). 
 45. E.g., United States v. Davis, 905 F.2d 245, 248–49 (9th Cir. 1990). 
 46. See, e.g., United States v. Ali, 718 F.3d 929, 946 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (pointing to statutory 
construction as a source of prosecutorial constraint).  
 47. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004) (holding that Congress may 
expressly contradict international law or do so “implicitly by treaties or statutes that occupy the 
field”). 
 48. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains . . . .”); see also Harford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 815 (1993) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Though it clearly has constitutional authority to do so, Congress is 
generally presumed not to have exceeded those customary international-law limits on 
jurisdiction to prescribe.”). 
 49. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 401 
(1987).  
 50. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (rejecting lower 
courts’ conclusions that extraterritorial application required a determination of subject matter 
(that is, adjudicatory) jurisdiction, rather than a determination of a case’s merits (that is, 
prescriptive jurisdiction)). The Court’s invocation of the presumption in Kiobel to decide the 
scope of the ATS—a “strictly jurisdictional” statute—should not confuse this point. See Kiobel 
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013). The Court never questioned 
Congress’s prescriptive capacity to enlarge the scope of the ATS. See id. at 1665 (“Congress, 
even in a jurisdictional provision, can indicate that it intends federal law to apply to conduct 
occurring abroad.”). 
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bases its legislation.51 Laws regulating activity within a state’s own 
borders or by its own nationals enjoy the strongest legitimacy,52 
whereas principles that are more tangentially related to a state’s 
sovereign concerns yield decreasing support internationally.53 This 
legitimacy is translated, via the Charming Betsy canon, into a 
presumptive limitation—albeit rebuttable—on how liberally 
legislation is construed.54 In practice, a court will employ the 
Charming Betsy canon to construe a statute in a way that does not 
violate international law.55 
Within this framework of constitutional and interpretive 
constraints, the presumption against extraterritoriality plays its own 
role. The presumption against extraterritoriality is a judicial canon for 
construing the law consistent with legislative purpose.56 So, unlike the 
express constitutional constraints, the presumption does not halt a 
determined legislature. However, the constitutional and prudential 
concerns embodied within the presumption against extraterritoriality 
may give it greater normative weight than the Charming Betsy canon. 
The presumption establishes a default scope of domestic legislation 
but gives way to Congress’s contrary intent.57 In that sense, the 
 
 51. Zachary D. Clopton, Bowman Lives: The Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Criminal 
Law After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 67 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 137, 143–45 
(2011). International law recognizes five principles: (1) the territorial principle, (2) the 
nationality principle, (3) the passive-personality principle, (4) the protective principle, and (5) 
the universal principle. Id. For further discussion of these jurisdictional principles, see Curtis A. 
Bradley, Universal Jurisdiction and U.S. Law, 2001 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 323, 324; John H. Knox, A 
Presumption Against Extrajurisdictionality, 104 AM. J. INT’L L. 351, 357 (2010).  
 52. CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION WITH RESPECT TO CRIME (Harvard Research in Int’l 
Law, Draft 1935), in 29 AM. J. INT’L L. (SUPP.) 435, 445 (1935) (explaining that the territorial 
and nationality principles have universal acceptance among states and offer primary 
justifications for action). 
 53. See id. at 445 (noting that state acceptance of the protective, universal, and passive-
personality principles is lower and generally offers only “auxiliary competence”). 
 54. See Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804) (“[A]n act of 
Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other possible 
construction remains . . . .”). 
 55. See, e.g., Ali-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“The only generally 
applicable role for international law in statutory interpretation is the modest one afforded by 
the Charming Betsy canon, which counsels courts, where fairly possible, to construe ambiguous 
statutes so as not to conflict with international law.”). 
 56. See Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992) (observing that “canons 
of construction are no more than rules of thumb that help courts determine the meaning of 
legislation” when statutory text is ambiguous). 
 57. YULE KIM, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., NO. 97-589, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: 
GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND RECENT TRENDS 17–18 (2008), available at http://www.fas.org/
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presumption against extraterritoriality is largely agnostic as to what 
Congress ultimately says and concerned only with how it says it. In 
particular, the presumption is a rule animated by geoambiguity. 
II.  THE PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY: 
PRESCRIPTIVE INTENT 
The geographical reach of U.S. law, then, is determined by 
statutory construction,58 that is, an inquiry into the meaning of an 
enacted law. The presumption against extraterritoriality describes the 
interpretive rule that, unless otherwise expressed, statutes are 
presumed to apply territorially only.59 Or as Justice Scalia has stated, 
“When a statute gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial 
application, it has none.”60 Implicit, yet axiomatic, to the operation of 
the presumption are two principles. First, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is animated when a court is asked to apply a U.S. 
law outside of U.S. borders. Second, evidence that Congress clearly 
intended an extended reach for the law can rebut this extraterritorial 
bar. In practice, the presumption has received various and liberal 
treatment, varying by statute and context. 
Three cases are salient to the presumption’s modern heritage. 
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co.61 initiated the extant line of 
jurisprudence on the presumption, whereas Morrison is the Supreme 
Court’s strong reaffirmation and clarification of it.62 In United States v. 
Bowman, however, the Court drew an analogy to American Banana 
and its civil jurisprudence, reasoning that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality might not have precisely the same effect in the 
criminal context.63 Since then, the presumption has had parallel but 
distinct applications to civil and criminal statutes, notwithstanding the 
occasional hat tip to the other line of jurisprudence.64 
 
sgp/crs/misc/97-589.pdf (noting that although some canons “favor particular substantive results,” 
Congress can rebut these presumptions by being clear in its contrary intent). 
 58. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“Whether Congress has 
in fact exercised that authority in these cases is a matter of statutory construction.”).  
 59. Through this presumption, courts constrain ambiguous legislation to the territorial 
principle of prescriptive jurisdiction. 
 60. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010). 
 61. Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347 (1909). 
 62. See infra Part III. 
 63. See United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922). 
 64. See, e.g., United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 811 (11th Cir. 2010) (citing Morrison to 
support the proposition that absent clear intent, a statute has no extraterritorial application). 
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A. Civil Application 
In 1909 Justice Holmes, writing for the Court, employed the 
presumption against extraterritoriality in an antitrust dispute between 
the American Banana Company and the United Fruit Company.65 
The Court, in setting the matter outside the scope of the Sherman 
Act,66 emphasized the wholly foreign events of the dispute and “the 
improbability of the United States attempting to make acts done in 
Panama or Costa Rica [unlawful].”67 The two key elements of the 
inquiry for the presumption against extraterritoriality can be 
discerned in Holmes’s words: congressional intent and the situational 
triggers of the presumption. 
First, the congressional intent sufficient to rebut the presumption 
has been understood to require more than “boilerplate” language68 or 
negative inference,69 but it has not been deemed to require a “clear 
statement rule”70—as opposed to a “clear indication” of 
extraterritoriality.71 Consistent with conventional judicial approaches 
to statutory construction, courts have recourse to statutory context to 
find intent, absent an express statement of geographic scope.72 
However, merely “possible” or “plausible” congressional intent 
 
But see United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 302–03 (D.D.C. 2011) (relying on 
Morrison in the same manner, but explicitly refusing to extend Morrison’s civil application to 
the criminal context). 
 65. See Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 353, 357 (‘“All legislation is prima facie territorial.’” 
(quoting Ex parte Blain, (1879) 12 Ch.D. 522 (C.A.) at 528 (Eng.))).  
 66. Sherman Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7 
(2012)). 
 67. Am. Banana, 213 U.S. at 357. In fact, United Fruit allegedly induced Costa Rican 
soldiers to seize a Panamanian plantation owned by American Banana. Id. at 354–55. 
 68. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 252 (1991) (“Title VII’s more limited, 
boilerplate ‘commerce’ language does not support such an expansive construction of 
congressional intent.”). 
 69. See Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 (1993) (noting that the presumption is not 
rebutted when the statute “specifically addresses the issue of extraterritorial application in [an] 
exception”). 
 70. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010).  
 71. Id. at 2878. The distinction between a clear-statement rule and a clear-indication rule is 
subtle but, as Justice Marshall emphasized, it determines the tools of statutory interpretation 
available to a court. See Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 261 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (noting that 
a clear-statement rule “relieves a court of the duty to give effect to all available indicia of the 
legislative will,” as compared to clear indication, which permits access to “traditional tools” of 
statutory construction). 
 72. See id. at 2883 (“Assuredly context can be consulted as well.”). 
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proves insufficient to rebut the presumption.73 Second, courts 
historically employed one of three tests—the conduct test, effects test, 
or conduct-and-effects test—to determine whether any given set of 
circumstances invoked the presumption’s operation, considering the 
presumption’s inherent yet circumscribed application to 
extraterritorial cases. 
The conduct test was popularly associated with Justice Holmes’s 
opinion in American Banana, wherein he advocated application of the 
presumption whenever the relevant conduct occurred outside U.S. 
borders.74 Conversely, the effects test suspended the presumption 
when the consequent effects were felt domestically, regardless of 
where the relevant conduct occurred.75 Having established two 
 
 73. See Arabian Am. Oil, 499 U.S. at 253 (“If we were to permit possible, or even plausible, 
interpretations . . . , there would be little left of the presumption.”); see also Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 
at 2887 (dismissing the argument that an extraterritorial remedy’s consistency with customary 
international law is wholly beside the point of what Congress wanted). Some pre-Morrison 
courts, though, delved into whether Congress would have wanted a particular statute to govern 
a particular case’s facts, that is, into the possible and plausible. See, e.g., Bersch v. Drexel 
Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 985 (2d Cir. 1975) (“[In a case of predominately foreign 
transactions, a court] must seek to determine whether Congress would have wished the precious 
resources of United States courts and law enforcement agencies to be devoted to them rather 
than leave the problem to foreign countries.”); cf. In re Alstom, 406 F. Supp. 2d 346, 375 
(S.D.N.Y. 2005) (positing that the inquiry into extraterritorial intent is a policy-based 
determination constrained only by reasonableness). Notwithstanding some critical 
admonishments of such an elastic approach, courts demonstrated significant deference to the 
“preeminent” jurisprudence of the Second Circuit that permitted such speculative analyses. See 
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880 (citing Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (1987), 
abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869) (observing the D.C. Circuit’s concern that the Second 
Circuit’s approach constituted a process of divination (citing Zoelsch v. Arthur Anderson & 
Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (1987), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869)). 
 74. See Am. Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909) (“[T]he general and 
almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or unlawful must be determined 
wholly by the law of the country where the act is done.”). The Second Circuit famously applied 
the conduct test to the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange 
Act) to withhold statutory remedies when neither the fraudulent acts nor the securities 
transactions occurred domestically. Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 
1326, 1334 (2d Cir. 1972). The Ninth Circuit also utilized the conduct test to constrain 
application of federal copyright law to U.S.-based infringement, whereas the U.S. Bankruptcy 
Court for the Southern District of New York similarly reasoned that U.S. bankruptcy law did 
not permit a debtor to claw back assets that had been preferentially transferred to creditors in 
England. William S. Dodge, Understanding the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality, 16 
BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 85, 106–07 (1998). 
 75. Kelley Morris White, Note, Is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Still Alive? Determining the 
Scope of U.S. Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in Securities Cases in the Aftermath of Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank, 37 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1187, 1206 (2012). The Second 
Circuit set out the effects test in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), 
abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869, as it attempted to determine whether the Exchange 
Act’s antifraud provisions applied to misrepresentations by a Canadian company whose foreign 
WILLIAMS IN PP (FLIP) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/20/2014  4:01 PM 
2014] THE SOMETIMES “CRAVEN WATCHDOG” 1393 
inverse methods for identifying extraterritorial cases, the Second 
Circuit combined the mutually independent conduct test and effects 
test to establish a third—the conduct-and-effects test76—following 
which courts liberalized the presumption in two significant ways. 
First, the two-pronged conduct-and-effects test provided for 
extraterritorial application of domestic law when either the conduct or 
the effect was territorial,77 thereby permitting courts to find sufficient 
territoriality to avoid invocation of the presumption, although the 
territorial connection would not have been sufficient under either the 
conduct test or the effects test independently.78 Second, the test, as 
applied by many courts, undermined the force of the presumption as 
a per se rule.79 The Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison ultimately 
disabused lower courts of this variegated approach to the 
presumption,80 but in the meantime the presumption acquired a 
different tone in the criminal context. 
B. Criminal Application 
The extraterritorial application of geoambiguous criminal 
statutes has developed parallel to civil litigation, but it has operated 
under a distinctive set of principles. Bowman suggested that 
geoambiguous criminal statutes are exceptions to the rule and may 
surmount the presumption more easily when certain types of offenses 
are implicated.81 In Bowman the Supreme Court was presented with 
facts alleging that four sailors conspired to submit fraudulent invoices 
charging the Fleet Corporation—in which the United States was the 
 
conduct had the ultimate effects of reducing its share value on a domestic exchange and, in turn, 
harming investors. Id. at 208–09. 
 76. See Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983), abrogated by 
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869. 
 77. See id. (considering the Schoenbaum effects test and the Leasco conduct test as 
independent and equally viable avenues for applying § 10(b) of the Exchange Act). 
 78. See Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Grp. PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 124 (2d Cir. 1995), abrogated by Morrison, 
130 S. Ct. 2869 (“[W]e hold that a sufficient combination of ingredients of the conduct and 
effects tests is present in the instant case to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the district 
court.”). 
 79. The Schoenbaum opinion went even further, diminishing the presumption and 
converting it into evidence of legislative intent to rebut countervailing policy imperatives. See 
Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206 (“[T]he usual presumption against extraterritorial application of 
legislation . . . [does not] show Congressional intent to preclude application of the Exchange 
Act . . . , when extraterritorial application of the Act is necessary to protect American 
investors.”). 
 80. See infra note 111 and accompanying text. 
 81. See infra note 85 and accompanying text. 
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sole stockholder—for delivery of oil to Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 
although it had not actually been delivered in the amount described.82 
The criminal conspiracy was alleged to have occurred variously on the 
high seas and in the port and city of Rio de Janeiro.83 Because the 
relevant section of the Criminal Code did not expressly identify a 
geographic scope, the Court was tasked with construing the statute’s 
extraterritorial applicability.84 Chief Justice Taft, writing for the 
Court, simultaneously acknowledged the background operation of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and asserted its inapplicability 
to a class of criminal statutes, like those presented in the case: fraud 
or obstruction directed against the government.85 Instead, the Court 
concluded that Congress’s intent to criminalize extraterritorial 
perpetration of those acts by U.S. citizens was inherent in the “nature 
of the offense.”86 
The Court in Bowman provided only a terse explanation of what 
characteristics the relevant crimes might share as a class, referencing 
(1) obstruction and fraud offenses, (2) the perpetration of which is 
not dependent on any given location, and (3) for which the potency 
and value of the statute would suffer from strict territoriality.87 
Subsequent applications of the Bowman exception to the 
presumption against extraterritoriality have emphasized or expanded, 
to varying degrees, these enumerated characteristics.88 These varying 
approaches can be classified under a threefold taxonomy. In some 
cases the exception has been applied only to crimes against the 
government directly, such as corruption, theft of government 
property, assault on federal agents, and conspiracy to kill U.S. 
officials.89 In other cases, criminal offenses exempted from strict 
application of the presumption were those that impinged on 
governmental interests, like inducement and encouragement of 
 
 82. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 95–96 (1922). 
 83. Id. at 96. 
 84. Id. at 97. 
 85. See id. at 98 (“[T]he same rule of interpretation should not be applied to criminal 
statutes which are, as a class, not logically dependent on their locality for the Government’s 
jurisdiction, but are enacted because of the right of the Government to defend itself against 
obstruction, or fraud wherever perpetrated, especially if committed by its own citizens, officers 
or agents.”). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Clopton, supra note 51, at 168. 
 89. Id. at 168–69 n.126 (citing, e.g., United States v. Layton, 855 F.2d 1388 (9th Cir. 1988); 
United States v. Benitez, 741 F.2d 1312 (11th Cir. 1984)). 
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unlawful immigration or fraudulent transfers in bankruptcy.90 Finally, 
courts have found that some crimes are so inherently transnational as 
to deserve the blessing of the Bowman exception.91 Typical crimes in 
this final category include trafficking (human or drug) and 
racketeering.92 
Beyond the types of crimes to which Bowman reasoning has 
been applied, courts have innovated also with the manner in which 
Bowman acts as an exception. The D.C. Circuit considered an 
adequate rebuttal of the presumption to be a statutory implication 
that the instant crime can be punished, not because of the locus of 
commission, but because of the government’s inherent right to defend 
itself against a class of crimes.93 The Second Circuit dispensed with the 
clear-indication requirement when Bowman applies.94 The Ninth 
Circuit concluded that the nature-of-the-offense inquiry allowed it to 
engage in speculative reasoning95—effectively bootstrapping intent 
based on the nature of the offense. 
* * * 
Until 2010, the civil and criminal lines of jurisprudence on the 
presumption against extraterritoriality were weak constraints on the 
effective scope of U.S. law, each in their own respect. The conduct-
and-effects test, in civil cases, allowed courts to redefine whether a 
law was really being applied extraterritorially, whereas the nature-of-
the-offense inquiry, in criminal cases, gave courts license to sanction 
foreign violations. In this context, plaintiff-petitioners Russell Leslie 
Owen, Brian Silverlock, and Geraldine Silverlock urged the Supreme 
 
 90. Id. at 169 n.129 (citing, e.g., United States v. Castillo-Felix, 539 F.2d 9 (9th Cir. 1976); 
Stegeman v. United States, 425 F.2d 984 (9th Cir. 1970)). 
 91. See id. at 170 (“The ‘nature of the offense’ approach is commonly applied to crimes 
that frequently manifest in transborder conduct or effects . . . .”). 
 92. Id. at 170 nn.136–38 (citing, e.g., United States v. Strevell, 185 F. App’x 841 (11th Cir. 
2006) (per curiam); United States v. Plummer, 221 F.3d 1298 (11th Cir. 2000); United States v. 
Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1994)). 
 93. See United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 304 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing Bowman 
v. United States, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922)). 
 94. See United States v. Gatlin, 216 F.3d 207, 211 n.5 (2d Cir. 2000) (asserting that the lack 
of “clear evidence” of congressional intent is not dispositive of whether a statute should be 
applied extraterritorially). 
 95. See Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d at 841 (“Congress would have intended that [the crime] 
be applied extraterritorially to cases involving the murder of DEA agents abroad.”). 
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Court to reverse the district court and Second Circuit in dismissing 
their suit against National Australia Bank.96 
III.  MORRISON: THE PRESUMPTION, REAFFIRMED AND 
STREAMLINED 
In Morrison the Court reaffirmed the importance of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality and redirected the course of its 
jurisprudence. The Court readdressed the long-lived debate about 
congressional intent and situational triggers by advancing (1) a strict 
approach to construing congressional intent and (2) a new test for 
identifying the relevant situational triggers.97 The question before the 
Morrison Court was whether U.S. federal courts had jurisdiction to 
resolve the Australian plaintiffs’ complaint that an Australian 
defendant, National Australia Bank (National), and several others 
deceived investors regarding the value of a U.S. subsidiary’s assets, 
which National was forced eventually to write down.98 Although 
National listed a number of American Depositary Receipts on the 
New York Stock Exchange, the plaintiffs purchased their common 
stock of National on a foreign securities exchange.99 The district court 
granted—and the Second Circuit affirmed—the defendants’ motion 
to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, given the at-most 
tenuous link between the domestic conduct and the largely foreign, 
fraudulent scheme.100 
Although the Supreme Court agreed that the plaintiffs could not 
successfully sue National, it fundamentally disagreed with the lower 
courts’ reasoning. The Morrison opinion began by disabusing the 
lower courts of the belief that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality was a function of a technical determination based 
on subject matter jurisdiction, rather than a merits determination 
based on an application of the law to particular facts.101 Moreover, the 
 
 96. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2876 (2010). 
 97. See infra notes 104–10 and accompanying text. 
 98. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875–76. The Morrison plaintiffs sued National, Florida-based 
mortgage company HomeSide Lending, National’s chief executive officer, and three of 
HomeSide’s executives. Id. at 2876. 
 99. See id. (“[National’s] Ordinary Shares . . . are traded on the Australian Stock Exchange 
Limited and on other foreign securities exchanges, but not on any exchange in the United 
States. . . . As relevant here, [the plaintiffs] purchased National’s Ordinary Shares in 2000 and 
2001 . . . .”).  
 100. Id. at 2876. 
 101. Id. at 2877. 
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Court stated that the lower courts’ application of the presumption 
was fundamentally flawed, thus recharacterizing both when the 
presumption is animated and how the presumption is rebutted.102 
The Court in Morrison introduced a two-step test. At the first 
step, the Court asked the threshold question of whether Congress 
intended the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)103 to 
apply abroad.104 As the Court firmly stated, “When a statute gives no 
clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”105 In 
Morrison, the Court concluded that the Exchange Act had solely 
domestic application, finding “no affirmative indication” that the 
relevant statutory sections were intended to apply abroad.106 At the 
second step, the Court inquired as to whether the Morrison facts 
could be characterized as extraterritorial.107 This second element was 
important because the presumption becomes a moot legal prohibition 
if the relevant aspects of the dispute could be characterized as having 
occurred domestically. The Court answered this question by turning 
to the statutory focus in § 10(b) of the Exchange Act, and by 
concluding that Congress’s primary concern was “not upon the place 
where the deception originated, but upon purchases and sales of 
securities in the United States.”108 Therefore, notwithstanding the 
plaintiffs’ assertions that certain substantive acts of the fraudulent 
scheme occurred in the United States,109 the relevant aspects of the 
matter—the transactions themselves—occurred outside of the United 
States.110 
On its face Morrison strongly reaffirms the presumption against 
extraterritoriality and provides some clear guidelines for its 
application. First, the traditional tests are dead, and, in their stead, a 
 
 102. See id. at 2883–84 (noting that “some domestic activity” does not make the 
presumption inapplicable if that activity is not the “focus” of the statute, and that the 
presumption is not rebutted without a “clear indication” that Congress intended extraterritorial 
effect). 
 103. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012).  
 104. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884 n.9 (“If § 10(b) did apply abroad, we would not need to 
determine which transnational fraud it applied to; it would apply to all of them (barring some 
other limitation).”). 
 105. Id. at 2878. 
 106. Id. at 2883. 
 107. Id. at 2884. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 2883–84. 
 110. See id. at 2888 (“This case involves no securities listed on a domestic exchange, and all 
aspects of the purchases complained of . . . occurred outside the United States.”). 
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much narrower test based on a statutory “focus” has been blessed.111 
Second, although the Court gave space for inquiries into legislative 
intent, it admonished against speculation as to what Congress would 
have intended had it considered the present facts.112 The extent to 
which this test precludes a purposivist finding of extraterritorial intent 
is unclear,113 but it does suggest the need for a textual hook based on 
more than “possible interpretations,” boilerplate language, or 
negative inferences from statutory exceptions.114 
However, it also leaves some important issues unresolved or 
ambiguous on closer examination. For example, there is little 
indication of how far Morrison’s two-step analysis applies beyond the 
Exchange Act.115 Even if it is generalizable to other statutes, Morrison 
left open questions on how to determine a statute’s “focus.” In the 
aftermath of Morrison, courts have struggled with the key 
components of its directive: resolving a statute’s geoambiguity and 
identifying the statutory focus. On this count, the Racketeer 
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) Act116 has proved to 
 
 111. See id. at 2886. The Court has not clearly addressed whether the “focus” test can be 
characterized as a reincarnation of one of the former traditional tests. Compare Kiobel v. Royal 
Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (speaking in terms of extraterritorial 
“conduct”), and id. at 1670 (Alito, J., concurring) (emphasizing the centrality of the “event or 
relationship” of congressional focus), with William S. Dodge, Morrison’s Effects Test, 40 SW. L. 
REV. 687, 690–92 (2011) (“Under Morrison . . . the location of the conduct is 
irrelevant. . . . What is relevant instead is the location of the transaction affected by the 
fraudulent conduct—in other words, the location of the effects. . . . Morrison substituted a 
narrower effects test that turns solely on the location of the specific transaction affected by the 
fraud.”). Rather, the relevance of conduct or effect likely turns on how an extraterritorial 
statute characterizes the proscribed matter. 
 112. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881 (“The results of judicial-speculation-made-law—
divining what Congress would have wanted if it had thought of the situation before the court—
demonstrate the wisdom of the presumption against extraterritoriality. Rather than guess anew 
in each case, we apply the presumption in all cases . . . .”). 
 113. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1666 (examining the “historical background” of the ATS for 
rebuttal evidence of extraterritorial application). 
 114. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882–83. 
 115. The Court partially answered this question in Kiobel by applying the presumption to 
the ATS, but its ambiguous reference to the presumption’s principles—rather than the 
presumption itself—and the ATS’s status as a jurisdictional statute leave some room for debate. 
See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664 (invoking the presumption to constrain the ATS because of “the 
principles underlying the canon of interpretation similarly constrain courts . . . under the ATS”). 
 116. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2012). 
The RICO Act is a hybrid statute that combats organized crime by imposing criminal and civil 
liability for individuals or entities who engage in racketeering—a broadly inclusive set of 
predicate acts characteristic of organized crime, see 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)—and provides a private 
right of action. Gideon Mark, RICO’s Extraterritoriality, 50 AM. BUS. L.J. 543, 547–48 (2013). 
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be a fertile ground for post-Morrison litigation. In at least one case, a 
court has had to reexamine the RICO Act’s geographical scope.117 
Similarly, courts have struggled to accurately determine whether the 
circumstances implicating the statutory focus were extraterritorial. 
The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York has 
found, in seemingly incongruous fashion, that the focus of the RICO 
Act is the racketeering activity118 and, on another occasion, that its 
focus is the racketeering enterprise.119 
More significant for present discussion, the court did not discuss 
the holding’s implication for the Bowman exception. Courts have 
been substantially less willing to consider how far to extend Morrison 
beyond the civil context in which its strict holding is nested. In fact, 
Morrison appears to have had little effect on determinations of 
criminal liability: courts have consistently indicated, expressly or 
implicitly, that Bowman survives Morrison.120 
IV.  THE BOWMAN DOCTRINE’S FLAWED EXCEPTIONALISM AFTER 
MORRISON 
The Supreme Court in Morrison strongly reaffirmed the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. That reaffirmation has had 
considerable impact on the extraterritoriality of civil statutes,121 
whereas the effect has been less than substantial with respect to 
criminal statutes, as to which the Bowman exception continues to 
play a dominant role.122 Specifically, courts have been unwilling to 
recognize in Morrison a restrictive or invalidating effect on 
 
 117. See Sorota v. Sosa, 842 F. Supp. 2d 1345, 1348–49 (S.D. Fla. 2012) (holding that 
Morrison abrogated the Eleventh Circuit’s prior holding that the RICO Act has extraterritorial 
effect). 
 118. Chevron Corp. v. Donziger, 871 F. Supp. 2d 229, 243–45 (S.D.N.Y. 2012). 
 119. Cedeño v. Intech Grp., Inc., 733 F. Supp. 2d 471, 474 (S.D.N.Y. 2010). 
 120. See, e.g., United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2011) (disregarding 
Morrison in favor of the reasoning in Bowman); United States v. Singhal, 876 F. Supp. 2d 82, 97 
(D.D.C. 2012) (declining to extend Morrison beyond § 10(b), instead applying Bowman to 
allegations of mail fraud); United States v. Carson, No. SACR 09-00077-JVS, 2011 WL 7416975, 
at *7 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 20, 2011) (“Morrison does not mention Bowman, nor does it explicitly 
overrule it.”); United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293, 303 (D.D.C. 2011) (“Despite the 
emphasis of Morrison that the presumption against extraterritoriality applies ‘in all cases,’ 
recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has developed with nary a mention of Bowman . . . .” 
(citation omitted)). 
 121. See supra notes 117–19 and accompanying text. 
 122. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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Bowman.123 Nevertheless, Bowman stands uneasily next to Morrison. 
The latter offers a bright-line rule and is juxtaposed against the 
former’s porous standard. Morrison espoused a strong disdain for 
policy-based inquiries into whether extraterritorial application is 
appropriate;124 Bowman appears to be premised on such an inquiry.125 
Whereas the Morrison opinion lacks any intimation that the Court 
was concerned about the functioning of securities regulation when it 
constrained the effect of the Exchange Act,126 application of Bowman 
sometimes explicitly assesses the integral role that extraterritorial 
application plays in a regulatory regime.127 
Not only do the circumstances call for courts to reconcile the 
relationship between Morrison and Bowman, but there is also a 
strong case for narrowing the influence of Bowman in statutory 
interpretation of federal criminal law. The Bowman exception is 
arguably a defunct doctrine in Supreme Court jurisprudence, at least 
to the extent that it justifies a liberal inference of congressional intent. 
Since establishing this exception to the presumption, members of the 
Court have cited to Bowman for precedent on extraterritoriality 
fourteen times,128 most recently in Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hartford 
Fire Insurance Co. v. California.129 Of those fourteen citations, 
however, fewer than half can be (even generously) construed to rely 
on Bowman for the proposition that extraterritorial application is 
 
 123. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
 124. See supra note 112. 
 125. See, e.g., United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 841 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Congress 
would have intended that [the crime] be applied extraterritorially to cases involving the murder 
of DEA agents abroad.”). 
 126. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2894 n.12 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (concluding that the Court’s decision may not extend to Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) enforcement action). 
 127. See United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 66 (2d Cir. 2011) (“‘Congress is presumed 
to intend extraterritorial application of criminal statutes where . . . restricting the statute to 
United States territory would severely diminish the statute’s effectiveness.’” (quoting United 
States v. Yousef, 327 F.3d 56, 87 (2d Cir. 2003))). 
 128. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 
1, 12 (1957); United States v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11, 21 (1955); Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 
U.S. 280, 291 (1952); Foley Bros. v. Filardo, 336 U.S. 281, 284 (1949); Vermilya-Brown Co. v. 
Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 381 (1948); United States v. Anderson, 328 U.S. 699, 703 (1946); Skiriotes 
v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69, 73–74 (1941); United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 141, 143 (1933); 
Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102, 122 (1933); Goldsmith v. Zerbst, 1 RAPP 18, 19 (U.S. Nov. 
18, 1932) (Cardozo, J., in chambers); Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421, 425, 429, 437, 438 
(1932); Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501, 511, 513, 520 (1927); New York Cent. R.R. Co. v. 
Chisholm, 268 U.S. 29, 31 (1925).  
 129. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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justified by the nature of the offense, rather than by clear indication 
of congressional intent.130 In fact, the Court has not used Bowman for 
that latter purpose since 1952—in a dissenting opinion.131 Justice 
Scalia’s own reference to Bowman, in Hartford Fire, was merely to 
bolster the proposition that Congress has the constitutional authority 
to extend U.S. laws extraterritorially.132 
This Part lays out the case for constraining the Bowman 
exception, first, by describing the reasons why the Court repeatedly 
invokes the presumption against extraterritoriality, and, then, by 
arguing that, rather than permitting the Bowman exception to 
operate effectively as an inverse presumption, courts should subject 
extraterritorial application of federal criminal law to the strict 
principles of Morrison, either by constraining the Bowman exception 
to the facts of the original case or by abrogating the Bowman-style 
reasoning completely. Finally, it challenges the two primary, 
alternative approaches for reconciling Bowman and Morrison, 
showing that restriction or invalidation is the better approach. 
A. Rationales for the Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
Professor William S. Dodge identifies six discrete arguments that 
have been advanced to rationalize the presumption.133 The first 
rationale conceives of the presumption as a product of a customary 
international law prohibition against extraterritorial laws and a 
canonical disfavor for interpretations of domestic law that violate 
 
 130. See Bulova Watch, 344 U.S. at 291 (Reed, J., dissenting) (“There are . . . cases in which 
a statement of specific contrary intent will not be deemed so necessary.”); Anderson, 328 U.S. at 
703 (“Since the statute does not indicate where Congress considered the place of committing the 
crime to be, the locus delicti must be determined from the nature of the crime alleged and the 
location of the act or acts constituting it.” (citations omitted)); Skiriotes, 313 U.S. at 73–74 (“[A] 
criminal statute dealing with acts that are directly injurious to the government, and are capable 
of perpetration without regard to particular locality, is to be construed as applicable to citizens 
of the United States upon the high seas or in a foreign country, though there be no express 
declaration to that effect.”); Maul, 274 U.S. at 520 n.21 (referring to a list of “offenses . . . which 
usually take place on the high seas”); Chisholm, 268 U.S. at 31 (“It contains no words which 
definitely disclose an intention to give it extraterritorial effect, nor do the circumstances require 
an inference of such purpose.”). 
 131. See Bulova Watch, 344 U.S. at 291 (Reed, J., dissenting) (“Where the case involves the 
construction of a criminal statute ‘enacted because of the right of the Government to defend 
itself against obstruction, or fraud . . . committed by its own citizens,’ it is not necessary for 
Congress to make specific provisions that the law ‘shall include the high seas and foreign 
countries.’” (quoting United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922))). 
 132. See Hartford Fire, 509 U.S. at 813–14 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 133. Dodge, supra note 74, at 112–23. 
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international law.134 Second, the conflict-of-laws basis asserts that the 
law governing a controversy should be that of the forum wherein the 
act occurred.135 Third, just as Congress presumably desires to avoid 
conflict with international law, it is presumed to want to promote 
international comity among foreign nations.136 According to that 
rationale, the presumption acts as a conflict-avoidance tool.137 
Relatedly, the fourth rationale, separation of powers, grounds itself in 
an argument about institutional competency; that is, courts are not 
institutionally suited to assess the consequences of antagonistic 
domestic law on foreign relations.138 Fifth, the presumption can act as 
a signal to Congress about how courts will interpret statutes, thereby 
providing a background rule on how to draft legislation that will 
achieve the legislature’s intent.139 The final rationale assumes that 
Congress is primarily concerned with domestic conditions, and that, 
when Congress turns its legislative eye abroad, it is the exception that 
proves the rule.140 
Dodge ultimately concludes that Congress’s domestic focus is the 
only valid justification for the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.141 However, Morrison’s strong reaffirmation of the 
presumption provided evidence that the canon is justified not only 
due to Congress’s domestic focus,142 but also because of the advantage 
in providing Congress with stable background principles143 and the 
 
 134. Id. at 113–14. Dodge reasons that this has been undermined by evolution of 
international law that sanctions geographic expansiveness of domestic law in certain situations. 
Id. 
 135. Id. at 114–15. As the strength of Justice Holmes’s theory of vested rights eroded, so has 
the strength of this rationale. See id. at 115 (observing that the conflict-of-laws jurisprudence has 
changed since Justice Holmes’s time and that “one cannot say there is a prevailing theory of 
conflicts”). 
 136. Id. However, Dodge questions the empirical basis for assuming that conflict between 
domestic and foreign laws has a negative effect and whether Supreme Court jurisprudence has 
consistently supported this rationale. Id. at 116–17. 
 137. Id. at 115. 
 138. Id. at 120.  
 139. Id. at 122. 
 140. Id. at 118. 
 141. See id. at 113 (“Only the notion that Congress generally legislates with domestic 
concerns in mind is a valid reason for the presumption today.”). 
 142. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (“[The 
presumption] rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to 
domestic, not foreign matters.”). 
 143. See id. at 2881 (“[W]e apply the presumption in all cases, preserving a stable 
background against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”). 
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importance of maintaining prescriptive comity.144 Doctrinal 
coherence, smart allocation of governmental authority, and fair notice 
complement and strengthen the goals evinced by these three 
rationales. 
B. The Case for Narrowing the Bowman Exception 
The Supreme Court should be dissuaded from perpetuating the 
simultaneous and divergent doctrines embodied by Morrison and 
Bowman.145 If the Court is to be believed that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is justified by Congress’s domestic focus, the 
desirability of affording the legislature a stable interpretive 
background, and the importance of prescriptive comity, then those 
principles are best served, in turn, by doctrinal coherence, smart 
allocation of governmental authority, and fair notice. The first of 
these reasons raises relational considerations between civil and 
criminal applications, whereas the latter two reasons address concerns 
following from an expansive exception. 
1. Doctrinal Coherence.  There is an intuitive desirability of 
imposing doctrinal coherence on the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. There is also strong evidence within the Morrison 
decision that the Court shares this sense. Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
Morrison espouses a strong bright-line rule favoring the application 
of the presumption, employing characteristically colorful metaphors 
to convey his point: “[T]he presumption against extraterritorial 
application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its 
kennel whenever some domestic activity is involved in the case.”146 
Not only does constraining the Morrison rule to civil contexts leave 
 
 144. See id. at 2885 (“The probability of incompatibility with the applicable laws of other 
countries is so obvious that if Congress intended such foreign application ‘it would have 
addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign laws and procedures.’” (quoting EEOC v. 
Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 256 (1991))). 
 145. This Note is not the first to consider the asymmetries of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. Zachary Clopton, a former federal prosecutor, similarly discusses how 
Bowman could be reconciled to Morrison’s stricter approach. See Clopton, supra note 51, at 
185–91. However, he misses the opportunity to seriously address the reasons why reconciliation 
is warranted, and he fails to propound a recommendation that sets the doctrines on equal 
footing. See id. at 187 (recommending the possibility of “a softer presumption in criminal 
cases”).  
 146. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. 
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criminal counterparts messy147 and rob criminal statutory construction 
of the exacting direction afforded civil statutory construction, but it 
also ignores the interrelationship between criminal and civil statutes 
that makes a coherent approach to statutory interpretation appealing. 
The doctrine’s current asymmetry and its drawbacks are readily 
apparent. First, the extant formulation of the Bowman exception 
causes unwieldy application of the presumption to criminal statutes. It 
carries the potential to eviscerate any geographic limitation on 
geoambiguous laws when the realities of a globalized and digital 
society make enforcement more difficult.148 If a key element of the 
standard is whether the nature of the offense makes unnecessary any 
express, statutory reference to geographical scope,149 the number of 
criminal offenses that could conceivably fall into that category grows 
as technological advancement makes proximity less germane. This 
argument does not belittle the importance, or understate the number, 
of offenses dependent on geographic proximity, on the one hand. 
Neither does it ignore the need for robust jurisdiction to counteract 
increasingly transnational crime, on the other. In fact, courts 
recognize that the criminal moniker does not talismanically invoke 
Bowman’s blessing.150 Rather, such de jure asymmetry is concerning, 
in this regard, because Bowman’s porous standard increasingly 
becomes the exception that swallows the rule. Although the Bowman 
exception has other relevant constraints—for example, Bowman 
addressed fraud and obstruction151—Bowman’s reasoning has been 
more favored and permitted an expansive approach to the 
exception.152 It is only slightly facetious to suggest that “street crime” 
against private citizens may be one of the few categories of offenses 
not excepted by Bowman.153 Moreover, if statutes are to be construed 
 
 147. See Clopton, supra note 51, at 168 (describing various degrees of breadth given to the 
Bowman exception). 
 148. See Ellen S. Podgor & Daniel M. Filler, International Criminal Jurisdiction in the 
Twenty-First Century: Rediscovering United States v. Bowman, 44 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 585, 592 
(2007) (observing that expansive criminal decisions based on Bowman “are deeply problematic 
on a policy level, particularly in an era of globalization where many countries may seek to 
enforce their respective interests both at home and abroad”). 
 149. United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94, 98 (1922). 
 150. See, e.g., United States v. Leija-Sanchez, 602 F.3d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 2010) (“Bowman 
does not hold that criminal statutes always apply extraterritorially.”). 
 151. Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98. 
 152. See supra notes 89–92 and accompanying text. 
 153. See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98 (“Crimes against private individuals or their property, like 
assaults, murder, burglary, larceny, robbery, arson, embezzlement and frauds of all kinds, which 
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in a geographically inconsistent manner, Congress should take the 
lead.154 
Second, the paradigmatic civil and criminal cases governed by 
Morrison and Bowman, respectively, are not so mutually independent 
as to offer a compelling justification for why different standards 
should apply. In fact, the two doctrines manifest salient 
interrelationships. After all, the criminal cases based on Bowman 
developed on the back of American Banana, a civil case.155 And, 
despite refusals to overlay Morrison’s restrictive precepts on criminal 
statutes, those opinions borrow generally from the civil context to 
otherwise support their propositions.156 
Hybrid statutes best exemplify the interrelationships between 
civil and criminal law. Many statutes—for example, the Sherman Act, 
the RICO Act, and the FCPA—have criminal and civil liability 
components. Imposition of a doctrinal distinction as a matter of law157 
could create incoherent application of these hybrid statutes,158 at least 
insofar as the court is construing statutory provisions common to both 
criminal and civil application.159 In FCC v. American Broadcasting 
Co.,160 the Court refused to allow the Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) to interpret the Communications Act of 1934161 
for civil regulatory purposes using a different standard than that used 
 
affect the peace and good order of the community, must of course be committed within the 
territorial jurisdiction of the government where it may properly exercise it.”). 
 154. See infra notes 206–16 and accompanying text. 
 155. See Bowman, 260 U.S. at 98 (justifying its locus-based exception with reference to 
American Banana, given that, although the case was a civil matter, the cause of action was based 
on a hybrid statute with criminal and civil components); see also supra notes 63, 65–67 and 
accompanying text. 
 156. See, e.g., United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 813–15 (11th Cir. 2010) (building a legal 
argument from precepts described in, for example, Morrison, Arabian Am. Oil, and Sale v. 
Haitian Centers Council, Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993)—all Supreme Court resolutions of civil 
disputes). 
 157. See infra Part IV.C. 
 158. Cf. Jonathan Marx, Note, How To Construe a Hybrid Statute, 93 VA. L. REV. 235, 268 
(2007) (“[T]he use of identical words is meaningful, and as such statutes employing identical 
words should be construed consistently. Thus, if the civil and criminal provisions of a hybrid 
statute are to have different scopes, it must be due to statutory mens rea . . . and not because 
some conduct is within the scope of civil liability but does not also fulfill the actus reus elements 
of the crime.”). 
 159. Id. at 241. But see Clopton, supra note 51, at 189 (dismissing the problems posed by 
hybrid statutes because they are “the exception, rather than the rule”). 
 160. FCC v. Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S. 284 (1954). 
 161. Communications Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.). 
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in criminal prosecutions brought by the Department of Justice.162 It 
would be anomalous to interpret a single statute in different ways, 
according to the nature of the case or the parties involved,163 without a 
clear indication that such an approach was intended by the 
legislature.164 Professor Margaret Sachs has identified four reasons 
justifying unified interpretations: congressional silence as to judicial 
authority to apply different standards for civil and criminal purposes; 
the presence of a single, undistinguished predicate wrong that forms 
the basis of civil and criminal liability; the interpretive practice of 
construing similar language similarly; and the difficulty in maintaining 
constructive distinctions as to the same statutory text.165 In fact, 
because of the unwillingness to extend Morrison to criminal contexts, 
the same statute might be subject to two divergent rules of statutory 
interpretation. 
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act166 (CFAA) offers a relevant 
example of how Morrison and Bowman could create inconsistent 
enforcement of the same legislation. For example, the United States 
criminalizes several forms of computer-related fraud167 and provides 
for civil recovery by injured parties.168 Although multiple offenses 
within the CFAA expressly identify “foreign commerce” as a 
jurisdictional hook,169 the boilerplate quality of some of the language 
makes it unclear whether such provisions would pass the Court’s 
clear-indication requirement for civil suit.170 Thus, private parties 
 
 162. See Am. Broad. Co., 347 U.S. at 296 (“It is true . . . that these are not criminal cases, but 
it is a criminal statute that we must interpret. There cannot be one construction for the [FCC] 
and another for the Department of Justice. If we should give [the statute] the broad 
construction urged by the [FCC], the same construction would likewise apply in criminal 
cases.”).  
 163. See Marx, supra note 158, at 267 (“The fact that the same statutory language could bear 
one meaning were civil canons applied to it, and another meaning were criminal canons applied 
to it, does not mean that it can bear both.”). 
 164. Id. at 269.  
 165. Margaret V. Sachs, Harmonizing Civil and Criminal Enforcement of Federal Regulatory 
Statutes: The Case of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 1025, 1031–33. 
 166. Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). 
 167. Id. §§ 1030(a)–(f). 
 168. Id. § 1030(g). 
 169. E.g., id. §§ 1030(a)(6)–(7). 
 170. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 252 (1991) (“[B]oilerplate 
‘commerce’ language does not support such an expansive construction of congressional 
intent.”); cf. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 U.S. 764, 814 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
(questioning whether the Sherman Act’s boilerplate jurisdictional language identifying 
commerce with foreign nations would be sufficient, if the Act’s extraterritoriality were not 
controlled by precedent). 
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suffering real injury from the perpetration of computer fraud might 
be barred by Morrison’s strict construction of intent. However, under 
a liberal reading of Bowman, such a perpetrator might be subject to 
criminal prosecution because of the lower threshold for finding 
extraterritorial intent. Rather than applying different rules of 
interpretation pursuant to the nature of the statute’s subject matter, 
courts should utilize one form of the presumption—the one espoused 
by the Morrison Court. 
Returning to the Court’s justifications for the presumption, the 
three rationales seem meaningful irrespective of the civil or criminal 
context in which the presumption is being considered.171 There is no a 
priori reason to believe that a domestic focus is more pressing when 
drafting civil laws than criminal laws. If courts presume Congress to 
be concerned primarily with the domestic effect of misconduct,172 
advocates of a strong Bowman exception are hard pressed to show, 
without more, that Congress’s default inward focus is suspended 
when addressing criminal penalties. Extraterritorial criminal 
enforcement is similarly likely to endanger international comity. In 
fact, criminal enforcement raises greater concerns for international 
comity because it carries official imprimatur. Finally, given the 
variegated and inconsistent manner in which courts have applied the 
Bowman exception, important strides are made toward providing a 
stable interpretive background for Congress if the presumption 
against extraterritoriality were collapsed into a unified doctrine. 
2. Allocation of Authority.  Wrapped within the discussion of an 
exception to the presumption against extraterritoriality is an 
argument regarding allocation of authority. In some settings such 
allocation may be discussed in terms of nondelegation or deliberative 
government. Of course, Bowman did not speak in these terms. 
However, whatever the terminology, the presumption against 
extraterritoriality tends to force careful consideration before 
expanding the breadth of the government’s sanctioning power. By 
contrast, without a consistent rule for approaching statutory 
ambiguity, unclear provisions have the potential to transfer 
lawmaking power to the interpreting body. Traditional application of 
 
 171. See supra notes 142–44 and accompanying text. 
 172. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877 (2010) (“[The 
presumption] rests on the perception that Congress ordinarily legislates with respect to 
domestic, not foreign matters.”). 
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the presumption against extraterritoriality might be understood, in 
one sense, as the judiciary’s refusal to accept latent authority to 
broadly construe geoambiguous statutes. 
In nondelegation terms the exception to the presumption, then, 
reverses that approach by normalizing the acceptability of delegation-
by-ambiguity to the courts or the executive. At the extreme, 
delegation-by-ambiguity can run afoul of the constitutional principle 
of separation of powers: the Constitution’s procedural safeguards are 
weakened;173 the public is robbed of the meaningful input of both 
political branches of government;174 and, in the case of executive 
interpretation, executive interests in robust enforcement and fair 
interpretation stand in conflict.175 This Note does not make the 
argument that the Bowman exception suborns unconstitutional 
delegation. At one level, such an argument is not a winning one.176 
Pragmatically, though, the better argument approaches the 
asymmetry from a higher level of generality: prudential and 
constitutional considerations of smart allocation of authority to define 
a statute’s scope militate against assigning such authority to the 
executive branch. Three corollaries follow: First, geoambiguity—as a 
form of congressional silence on a statute’s geographic scope—should 
not be understood as a presumptive transfer of authority to the 
executive. Second, ingrained legal principles belie the prudence of de 
facto—if not de jure—transfer of interpretive authority. Finally, 
under the specter of single-branch expansion of criminal statutes, the 
canon of constitutional avoidance should prevent liberal 
constructions of geoambiguous statutes absent congressional input. 
Important scholarship by Professors Eric Posner and Cass 
Sunstein has taken the contrary position, asserting that courts should 
defer to the executive in interpreting geoambiguous criminal 
statutes.177 This scholarship rests heavily on the Supreme Court’s own 
 
 173. See infra note 206 and accompanying text. 
 174. See infra notes 207–09 and accompanying text. 
 175. See infra notes 210–12 and accompanying text. 
 176. See Cass R. Sunstein, Nondelegation Canons, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 315, 322 (2000) (“We 
might say that the conventional [nondelegation] doctrine has had one good year, and [now 224] 
bad ones (and counting).”). 
 177. See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE 
L.J. 1170, 1173 (2007) (“[C]ourts should . . . draw on established principles of administrative law 
to permit executive interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms to overcome the international 
relations doctrines.”). 
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recognition of the presumption’s basis in international comity.178 At 
first blush, the prescriptive-comity argument appears to run counter 
to this Note’s recommendations. Prescriptive comity is concerned, 
after all, that extraterritorial laws may inadvertently cause foreign-
relations frictions.179 The presumption, as a court-imposed kill switch, 
prevents accidental frictions of international proportions. The clear 
indication of extraterritorial application—required to rebut the 
presumption—signals that the political branches have weighed the 
risks to foreign relations and made a deliberate determination that a 
law’s global enforcement has transcendent value.180 
The Posner-Sunstein proposal would assign sufficient weight to 
the executive branch’s interpretations to override international 
relations doctrines,181 such as the presumption against 
extraterritoriality.182 The executive branch has certain structural 
advantages over Congress when it comes to weighing the risks of 
extraterritorial application of law against the advantages.183 After all, 
the executive branch has the benefit of (1) access to information due 
to being on the frontline of enforcement and having a dedicated 
bureaucratic cadre assessing foreign relations and legal matters, and 
(2) timely action and a unified front. 
Essentially disagreeing with the first two corollaries described 
earlier, Posner and Sunstein have advocated for courts to defer to the 
executive branch on the application of foreign-relations doctrines to 
the same degree that courts accord deference to administrative 
agencies under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc.184—either under formal Chevron analysis or by analogy 
 
 178. See id. (characterizing the discussed doctrines as the “international comity doctrines”). 
 179. See EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (“It serves to protect 
against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could result in 
international discord.”). 
 180. Cf. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2885 (2010) (“The probability of 
incompatibility with the applicable laws of other countries is so obvious that if Congress 
intended such foreign application ‘it would have addressed the subject of conflicts with foreign 
laws and procedures.’” (quoting Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 256)). 
 181. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 177, at 1173 (“Our more ambitious goal is to suggest 
that courts should generally draw on established principles of administrative law to permit 
executive interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms to overcome the international relations 
doctrines.”). 
 182. See id. at 1179 (categorizing the presumption against extraterritoriality as a comity 
doctrine). 
 183. Id. at 1202, 1205. 
 184. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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to Chevron principles.185 They build their argument upon the concepts 
of executive competence and “constitutional warrant” for balancing 
policy interests and foreign relations considerations in the absence of 
a clear congressional mandate.186 According to such a Chevron-based 
argument, deference would follow from delegation because “courts 
presume that, when Congress charges an agency with administering 
an ambiguous statute, Congress is delegating lawmaking power to the 
agency.”187 Applying the two-step Chevron inquiry, the presumption 
against extraterritoriality would not stand as an automatic bar when a 
court cannot clearly discern whether Congress expressed a preference 
for the statute’s geographical scope.188 In such cases, Posner and 
Sunstein would say that courts should defer to the government’s 
interpretations of geographical scope, so long as they were 
reasonable.189 In the alternative, the Posner-Sunstein proposal would 
be to ascribe such deference to the executive branch’s institutional 
competence as to surmount the presumption against 
extraterritoriality in any case.190 This deference theory effectively 
rationalizes the approach already preferred by many courts when 
interpreting Bowman.191 It is the wrong approach for several reasons. 
First, despite the appeal to competence and accountability, 
presumptive delegation through Chevron deference is an 
inappropriate approach to reconciling the Bowman exception and 
Morrison. A pro-deference argument grounded in Chevron’s theory 
of presumptive delegation must first pass the wrinkle added by United 
States v. Mead Corp.192 In the wake of Chevron, deference to agency 
resolution of statutory ambiguity was understood to be based upon a 
legal fiction that ambiguity was an implied delegation of interpretive 
 
 185. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 177, at 1204–05.  
 186. Id. at 1177. They bolster their advocacy by attacking the value of international comity 
doctrines; that the benefits of deference to foreign regulations do not always outweigh the costs. 
Id. at 1185. 
 187. Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 670 
(2000). 
 188. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 177, at 1198 (“The international relations doctrines 
should not operate as constraints on the executive under Chevron Step One.”). 
 189. See id. (“If the executive’s interpretation is unreasonable, of course, it will be invalid 
under Step Two . . . .”). 
 190. Id. at 1205. 
 191. See supra notes 93–95, 120 and accompanying text. 
 192. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218 (2001). 
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authority.193 Mead, not precluding the possibility of implied 
delegation, imposed a threshold determination of actual legislative 
intent to delegate interpretive authority before applying Chevron 
deference.194 That determination is based, namely, on indications that 
Congress delegated the agency to act with the force of law and that 
the agency acted pursuant to that authority.195 The Mead Court 
identified, as a touchstone of legislative intent, the statutorily 
enumerated administrative procedure by which an agency was to act: 
statutory mandate to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment 
rulemaking being a sufficient example of such delegation.196 Such 
formal administrative or notice-and-comment procedures are notably 
absent from criminal prosecutions for extraterritorial conduct. 
Criminal statutes typically do not direct or authorize the Attorney 
General to engage in formalized procedures—drawing on public 
input—to prosecute violations of the statutes’ prescripts. Rather, 
federal prosecutors satisfy their statutory responsibilities through the 
interpretative and adjudicative authority of the judicial branch. 
Absent this determination, Mead should assign merely persuasive 
authority, rather than Chevron’s dispositive authority, to the 
government’s interpretation of geoambiguous statutes.197 
Second, even if executive branch interpretations have persuasive 
authority—as Posner and Sunstein argue in the alternative198—a 
practical flaw with the competence argument undermines the 
reasonableness of prioritizing prescriptive comity. There is plausible 
foundation to believe that the executive branch, as a whole, has 
 
 193. See id. at 240 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (observing that Chevron was previously justified by 
“a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a statute meant for implementation by 
an agency, understood that the ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency” 
(quoting Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996))). 
 194. See id. at 237 (majority opinion) (justifying use of Chevron deference when there are 
indications of actual congressional intent to delegate legally binding authority). 
 195. See id. at 226–27 (“[Agency action] qualifies for Chevron deference when it appears 
that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of 
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of 
that authority.”). 
 196. See id. at 227 (“Delegation of such authority may be shown in a variety of ways, as by 
an agency’s power to engage in adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking, or by some 
other indication of a comparable congressional intent.”). 
 197. See id. at 228, 237 (discussing Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944), as the 
default deference standard). 
 198. See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 177, at 1205 (“[I]n the domain of foreign relations, 
the approach signaled in Chevron should apply even if the executive is not exercising delegated 
authority to make rules or conduct adjudications.”). 
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greater institutional competence than the legislative or judicial branch 
when it comes to foreign relations. However, it does not follow 
necessarily that any particular enforcement agency has greater 
institutional competence in foreign relations or that it will even 
consider implications for foreign relations when prosecuting 
extraterritorial misconduct.199 Moreover, Professors Derek Jinks and 
Neal Kumar Katyal have rejected the Posner-Sunstein proposal by 
disputing that the executive branch’s legal positions enjoy any 
comparative advantage of institutional competence and 
accountability, absent assurances that bureaucratic expertise was 
actually involved in the development of those positions.200 
Third, although the presumption against extraterritoriality is 
concerned with international comity, harmony is not its exclusive 
rationale.201 Multiple Supreme Court opinions have employed the 
presumption using the premise that Congress legislates primarily with 
a concern for domestic matters.202 Moreover, the presumption is also a 
manifestation of the Court’s disdain for judicial speculation.203 It sets 
out for Congress a “background rule”—a reliable expectation—
against which legislation can be drafted to achieve what Congress 
actually intends.204 Therefore, the presumption is now at least as much 
about faithful agency as it is about achieving desirable outcomes. The 
Posner-Sunstein argument unjustifiably prioritizes prescriptive 
comity, to the exclusion of the presumption’s other goals. 
 
 199. See Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE 
L.J. 1230, 1280 (2007) (“[W]hen claims of a ‘unitary executive’ become so strong that they 
permit a President to compress or eliminate agency processes through political influence, and to 
bypass interagency debate altogether, deference is not being awarded on the basis of 
expertise. . . . To be sure, the President has a State Department, a Defense Department, law-of-
war experts, and the Judge Advocates General at his disposal, but each of these entities can be 
cut out under streamlined presidential decision-making.”). 
 200. See id. at 1281 (“To be sure, the President has accountability advantages (and 
comparative expertise advantages vis-à-vis the judiciary), but he does not possess those same 
advantages over Congress. In a case . . . in which the claims pit the powers of Congress against 
those of the President, deference to the latter can be appropriate, at most, only when the 
executive can present the argument as the product of deliberative and sober bureaucratic 
decision-making.”). 
 201. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2877–78 (2010) (“The canon or 
presumption applies regardless of whether there is a risk of conflict between [an] American 
statute and a foreign law . . . .”).  
 202. Id. at 2877; Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197, 204 n.5 (1993); EEOC v. Arabian Am. 
Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991). 
 203. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881 (observing the per se nature of the presumption against 
extraterritoriality as an advantage over “judicial-speculation-made-law”). 
 204. Id. 
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Fourth, the executive branch, empowered with the authority to 
enforce the law, has important and inherent discretion to decline 
enforcement in a given case.205 If the executive branch, generally, and 
the statutory enforcement agencies, like the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) or Department of Justice, specifically, enjoy a 
comparative advantage in institutional competence in foreign 
relations, it is an advantage better expressed by discrete executive 
decisions not to enforce the law, rather than a one-time decision to 
categorically extend an offense’s prescriptive scope. It is a much less 
controversial principle to permit discretionary, instance-specific 
nonenforcement of express statutory prohibitions, than to permit 
discretionary, wholesale expansion of a geoambiguous statute with 
the potential to cause international friction. The latter undermines 
the theory that the executive branch is actually developing a statutory 
interpretation with vagarious and sensitive international concerns in 
mind. Therefore, rather than justifying presumptive recourse to 
executive interpretation, existing law and the Court’s concern with 
international law suggest that the motivating principles behind a 
strict, civil presumption against extraterritoriality are similarly 
applicable to the presumption’s criminal function. 
Captured within this discussion of the appropriate allocation of 
authority is an argument for using the presumption against 
extraterritoriality to catalyze a constitutional preference for a 
deliberative government, as both a protection for weak and 
disfavored groups—of which criminals seemingly are included—and 
as a check on the executive branch’s power. In that regard, the 
current dichotomy of a presumption against extraterritoriality 
applying robustly in the civil context but markedly less so in the 
criminal context is concerning. Some statutory-interpretation 
principles are rooted in the concept of providing procedural 
protections to groups subject to harsh treatment,206 such as criminals. 
In this regard, interpretive canons—like the presumption against 
 
 205. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (“The Attorney General and 
United States Attorneys retain ‘broad discretion’ to enforce the Nation’s criminal laws.” 
(quoting Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607 (1985))). “In our system, so long as the 
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by 
statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to file or bring before a grand 
jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.” Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 364 (1978) 
(emphasis added). 
 206. See Sunstein, supra note 176, at 334 (noting a principle underlying some canons of 
construction that “require[s] a congressional judgment if a group perceived as weak or 
deserving is going to be treated harshly”). 
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extraterritoriality—play a beneficial role in ensuring that important 
decisions are made with the input of both political branches. As 
Sunstein argues: “[T]he nondelegation canons have the salutary 
function of ensuring that certain important rights and interests will 
not be compromised unless Congress has expressly decided to 
compromise them. Thus . . . it is entirely reasonable to think that for 
certain kinds of decisions, merely executive decisions are not 
enough.”207 Sunstein considers the interpretive canons to be the 
“modern nondelegation” doctrine.208 The canons espouse a preference 
for the involvement of both political branches in sensitive decisions, 
such as ones that would apply criminal laws beyond U.S. borders.209 If 
Congress is responsible for enacting the statute, it is reasonable to 
expect it to have a role in determining the scope of the risk its 
legislation poses to foreign relations. 
Returning to the matter of deference to the executive branch, 
Jinks and Katyal express concern that deference to agency expertise 
in interpreting ambiguous statutory terms, especially in the criminal 
context, is a one-way ratchet;210 enforcement agencies will always 
interpret a geoambiguous statute expansively, especially given their 
subsequent discretion as to whether to prosecute any particular 
violation. Even Posner and Sunstein acknowledge this concern 
regarding self-serving interpretation, observing that deference may 
not be deserved when the interpretation is the product of a “mere 
litigation position.”211 As a matter of course, the legal proposition that 
an ambiguous federal criminal statute should be interpreted as 
enforceable abroad is likely to arise almost exclusively in the course 
of litigation or comparable adversarial contexts. There is a weaker 
argument that permitting the executive branch to determine the 
geographical scope of an ambiguous criminal statute allows the 
executive to aggrandize both legislative power to prescribe the scope 
of a statute—when it has not clearly and narrowly assigned that 
 
 207. Id. at 338. 
 208. Id. at 342. 
 209. See id. at 333 (“If statutes are to receive extraterritorial application, it must be as a 
result of a deliberate congressional judgment to this effect. The central notion here is that 
extraterritorial application calls for extremely sensitive judgments involving international 
relations; such judgments must be made via the ordinary lawmaking process (in which the 
President of course participates). The executive may not make this decision on its own.”). 
 210. See Jinks & Katyal, supra note 199, at 1266 n.132 (“What undergirds the traditional 
reluctance is the fear of presidential self-dealing—that a President can interpret a statute to 
expand his own power over individuals.”). 
 211. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 177, at 1214–15. 
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discretion to the executive—and judicial power to interpret 
congressional intent.212 
Moreover, the asymmetric application of the presumption 
against extraterritoriality raises serious constitutional concerns 
related to due process213 and the separation of powers.214 These 
concerns should cause courts, at a minimum, to reconsider an across-
the-board application of the Bowman exception. Channeling the 
words of Chief Justice Burger in National Labor Relations Board v. 
Catholic Bishop of Chicago,215 “[I]n the absence of a clear expression 
of Congress’ intent . . . , we decline to construe [an] [a]ct in a manner 
that could in turn call upon the Court to resolve difficult and sensitive 
questions arising out of the guarantees of the [Constitution].”216 Given 
the far-reaching implications of deciding a case with latent 
constitutional questions, a narrow construction of a statute raising 
such questions has at least two benefits. First, it avoids the creation of 
precedent on a constitutional matter that was neither directly 
addressed nor fully developed by the case. Second, it forces Congress 
to deliberate on the precise issue of whether a given statute was 
enacted with extraterritorial effect. 
Nevertheless, a tool of constitutional avoidance is a blunt 
instrument. Although using the presumption to avoid difficult 
constitutional questions may ensure that constitutional rights are not 
burdened by hard-to-reverse interpretations, it also has the potential 
for “distorting . . . policy choices” and thwarting the democratic will 
of Congress.217 For that reason, the Court has insisted that the 
constitutional avoidance canon not be employed to construe a statute 
in such a way as to impose a policy that is disingenuous or not 
plausible on the statute’s face.218 A criminal mirror to Morrison’s strict 
presumption against extraterritoriality would have the additional 
 
 212. Cf. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) (“It is this concern of 
encroachment and aggrandizement that has animated our separation-of-powers 
jurisprudence . . . . Accordingly, we have not hesitated to strike down provisions of law that 
either accrete to a single Branch powers more appropriately diffused among separate Branches 
or that undermine the authority and independence of one or another coordinate Branch.”). 
 213. See infra Part IV.B.3. 
 214. See supra notes 205–12. 
 215. NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chi., 440 U.S. 490 (1979). 
 216. Id. at 507.  
 217. David M. Driesen, Loose Canons: Statutory Construction and the New Nondelegation 
Doctrine, 64 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 16 (2002). 
 218. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (noting that “the saving construction” 
may not be disingenuous to a statute’s plain meaning). 
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salutary effect of acting as a proxy canon of constitutional avoidance. 
That is, geoambiguous statutes that can plausibly be interpreted as 
having no extraterritorial effect would have none and, thereby, would 
avoid the constitutional questions of due process and separation of 
powers. The criminal statutes at issue do not raise the Court’s concern 
for “disingenuous evasion” of the statutes’ policies.219 Rather, these 
statutes are facially ambiguous as to geographical scope; that is, their 
express provisions do not definitively resolve the reach of the 
statutes’ prescriptions. Application of Morrison’s narrow test would 
ensure that a court engages in a statute-by-statute examination of the 
criminal provisions to determine whether the focus of those 
provisions is domestic or extraterritorial. 
The circumstances in which the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is considered do not justify accepting as dispositive 
the government’s interpretation of geoambiguity. The presumption 
against extraterritoriality is not solely concerned with foreign 
relations. Neither is it obvious that the executive has, in practice, a 
clear comparative advantage in weighing the costs and benefits of 
foreign enforcement. Rather, even if it does, such a cost-benefit 
determination is best expressed in selective nonenforcement. 
Moreover, foreign-relations risks posed by legislation should be 
considered and resolved through the input of both political branches. 
3. Fair Notice.  The final legal point that supports subordination 
of the Bowman exception to Morrison is not complex, but it is 
nonetheless weighty. The Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed a 
principle of fair notice when criminal statutes contain ambiguous or 
inconsistent terms.220 This concept of fair notice—often manifesting as 
the rule of lenity—is, at its heart, a policy animated by due process 
and concerned with forcing the legislature to clearly condemn 
conduct as criminal as to afford law-abiding citizens the opportunity 
to bring their behavior into conformity.221 Although the Court has 
 
 219. Id. (quoting United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1985)). 
 220. See, e.g., Chapman v. United States, 500 U.S. 453, 463 (1991) (describing the rule of 
lenity as a basis for construing a criminal statute favorably to the defendant when all attempts to 
identify congressional intent still result in “‘grievous ambiguity or uncertainty in the language 
and structure of the Act’” (quoting Huddleston v. United States, 415 U.S. 814, 831 (1974)); 
United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 347 (1971) (“‘[A]mbiguity concerning the ambit of criminal 
statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.’” (quoting Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 
812 (1971))).  
 221. See Bass, 404 U.S. at 348. 
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constrained the use of the defendant-friendly rule of lenity,222 judicial 
regard for fair notice, generally, thrives. Moreover, the potential for 
extraterritorial application of a criminal statute with intractably 
geoambiguous scope to raise due process claims is glaring. When 
courts applying the Bowman exception circumvent findings of 
congressional intent by resorting to speculative judgments of how 
Congress would have wanted a statute to apply,223 such application 
would seem to be premised on the type of “grievous ambiguity or 
uncertainty” that the Supreme Court considers a precondition before 
enforcement yields to the rule of lenity.224 
The presumption against extraterritoriality, when applied 
consistently, operates as a lenity-rule proxy by construing 
geoambiguous statutes against the government. Harking back to the 
earlier discussion of doctrinal consistency and coherence, the 
protection that due process principles afford to criminal defendants 
would be manifestly inverted if Bowman and its progeny were 
distinguished from Morrison according to subject matter or actor. 
Given the default assumption that Congress legislates primarily with 
a domestic focus,225 principles of due process should demand that a 
law—civil or criminal—provide fair notice of departure from that 
baseline. The presumption against extraterritoriality enforces that 
requirement for civil statutes by way of its clear-indication 
requirement.226 However, Bowman watered down such notice by 
asserting, as a matter of law, that nature-of-the-offense inquiries do 
not require a strained construction of statutory intent.227 
Given the greater consequences of criminal sanction and the 
presence of higher persuasion standards in criminal trials, it would be 
 
 222. See, e.g., Muscarello v. United States, 524 U.S. 125, 138 (1998) (rejecting a rule-of-lenity 
argument over the dissent’s claims that robust dispute within the Court over the meaning of 
“carry” inherently implied residual ambiguity that should be resolved in favor of the defendant); 
Chapman, 500 U.S. at 463–64 (suggesting that, absent an “absurd or glaringly unjust” statutory 
construction, there is no “reasonable doubt” of Congress’s intent sufficient to invoke the rule of 
lenity). 
 223. See United States v. Vasquez-Velasco, 15 F.3d 833, 841 (9th Cir. 1994) (“Congress 
would have intended that [the crime] be applied extraterritorially to cases involving the murder 
of DEA agents abroad.” (emphasis added)). 
 224. See Chapman, 500 U.S. at 463 (quoting Huddleston, 415 U.S. at 831) (quotation mark 
omitted). 
 225. See supra notes 140–42 and accompanying text. 
 226. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010) (“When a statute 
gives no clear indication of an extraterritorial application, it has none.”). 
 227. Clopton, supra note 51, at 191.  
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an unusual doctrine that provided for extraterritorial application of 
geoambiguous criminal laws using less stringent indications of 
congressional intent than similar civil laws.228 Similarly, permitting 
public actors greater leeway than private actors with respect to 
extending the application of statutes with geoambiguous scope may 
provide for greater recognition and promotion of government 
interests, but it provides little support for the proposition that a 
potential violator of statutory provisions will be on notice as to a law’s 
extraterritorial application. 
C. Distinction-Based Alternatives to Narrowing the Bowman 
Exception 
Although the foregoing arguments march toward the conclusion 
that Morrison and the Bowman exception should be reconciled 
through the latter’s restriction or abrogation, its subordination to 
Morrison is not the only option. Courts could perpetuate the 
Bowman exception by distinguishing Morrison on the grounds that 
either (1) criminal subject matter warrants special statutory rules, or 
(2) public actors deserve greater latitude than private actors to pursue 
statutory violations abroad. As this Section demonstrates, however, 
these alternatives do not withstand scrutiny. 
1. Criminal-Civil Distinctions.  One option for a Bowman-
Morrison distinction is on the basis of criminal and civil subject 
matters. Others have observed that “[w]hile Morrison has the 
potential to extend to criminal cases, . . . the broad spectrum of cases 
to which Morrison may be extended will probably not include 
criminal cases.”229 This distinction could establish the Bowman 
exception as a subject-matter exception to Morrison’s general 
presumption230 or it could doctrinally sever the relationship between 
civil and criminal applications of the statutory interpretation of 
extraterritorial application. The latter option finds support in some 
courts’ opinions post-Morrison. 
 
 228. See Marx, supra note 158, at 244–45 (noting the dual purposes of the rule of lenity to be 
“prevent[ing] excessive delegation of criminal lawmaking power to the judiciary” and 
“[s]kewing statutory construction toward under- rather than overcriminalization [to] help[] 
ensure that no defendant is convicted for behavior that the legislature did not intend to 
criminalize”).  
 229. White, supra note 75, at 1237. 
 230. Clopton, supra note 51, at 181. 
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The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed 
Morrison-type reasoning in favor of the Bowman-based exception in 
United States v. Campbell.231 In that case, Neil Campbell, an 
Australian national indicted for soliciting a bribe from a 
subcontractor on a U.S. government–funded project in Afghanistan, 
moved to dismiss his indictment because the substantive statute 
lacked explicit extraterritorial application.232 The district court denied 
the motion, concluding that, notwithstanding the per se application of 
the Morrison presumption, the Court’s opinion applied directly to 
civil matters and lacked any indication of consequence to criminal 
cases.233 
The Second Circuit substantially agreed with this position in 
affirming the conviction of a man charged with sexually abusing his 
minor daughter in conjunction with travel between the United States 
and Belgium.234 Although the court concluded that the textual 
reference to “foreign commerce” and the statute’s grammatical 
structure provided sufficient evidence of extraterritorial intent,235 the 
court questioned whether the presumption against extraterritoriality 
should apply at all.236 Instead, the court cited sister-circuit precedent 
to suggest that the presumption against extraterritoriality is either 
weaker or nonexistent in the criminal context.237 
The most important rejoinder to the alternative, criminal-civil 
proposition is that the resulting doctrine would be to formalize the 
status quo; it would necessarily continue to ignore all of the foregoing 
concerns regarding the existing doctrinal asymmetries. Additionally, 
it would functionally liberalize the Bowman exception beyond how it 
is currently applied. Bowman, by its terms, does not apply to all 
 
 231. United States v. Campbell, 798 F. Supp. 2d 293 (D.D.C. 2011). 
 232. Id. at 296–97. Campbell was indicted for violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B) for 
“solicitation of a bribe by an agent of an organization receiving more than $10,000 in federal 
funds.” Id. at 296. 
 233. See id. at 303 (“Despite the emphasis of Morrison that the presumption against 
extraterritoriality applies ‘in all cases,’ recent Supreme Court jurisprudence has developed with 
nary a mention of Bowman and has predominately involved civil statutes.” (citation omitted)). 
 234. See United States v. Weingarten, 632 F.3d 60, 62–63 (2d Cir. 2011).  
 235. Id. at 65–66. 
 236. Id. at 66. 
 237. See id. (“[T]here is reason to doubt that the presumption against extraterritoriality 
applies [here] at all. . . . ‘Bowman does not hold that criminal statutes always apply 
extraterritorially’ and instead requires ‘judges . . . [to] consider the language and function of the 
prohibition’ . . . .” (second and third alterations in original) (quoting United States v. Leija-
Sanchez, 602 F.3d 797, 799 (7th Cir. 2010))). 
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criminal statutes,238 and, though some courts have generously 
construed Bowman’s applicability, even those progressive 
applications have not made the exception completely coextensive 
with the criminal context.239 The inadvertent result of such a doctrinal 
division could be that a number of new classes of criminal offenses 
could be afforded extraterritorial effect. 
2. Public-Private Actor Distinctions.  The second option, a public-
private actor distinction, transcends the criminal-civil divide by 
recognizing that many civil-enforcement agencies share relevant 
characteristics with criminal-enforcement authorities.240 This 
alternative manner of preserving the Bowman exception and 
distinguishing Morrison finds support in Morrison itself in the final 
footnote of Justice Stevens’s concurring opinion. Hidden in his 
disparagement of the Court’s transactional test,241 the concurring 
Justice alerted the reader to the fact that “[t]he Court’s opinion does 
not . . . foreclose the [SEC] from bringing enforcement actions in 
additional circumstances, as no issue concerning the Commission’s 
authority is presented by this case.”242 
According to Justice Stevens’s ostensibly narrow interpretation 
of Morrison’s holding, the SEC may have been able to bring the same 
case in the plaintiffs’ stead with a different result.243 Justice Stevens 
cites two reasons for distinguishing private suits from public 
enforcement of the Exchange Act: a public actor’s sensitivity to 
international comity244 and the fewer restrictions on how it effectuates 
the statute’s prohibitions.245 This public-private actor distinction has 
 
 238. See supra note 87 and accompanying text. 
 239. See supra notes 88–92 and accompanying text. 
 240. For example, the SEC pursues civil enforcement of securities law violations. 
 241. See Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2895 (2010) (Stevens, J., 
concurring) (“[W]hile the clarity and simplicity of the Court’s test may have some salutary 
consequences, like all bright-line rules it also has drawbacks.”). 
 242. Id. at 2894 n.12. 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. at 2891–92 & n.7 (citing F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 
171 (2004)). “‘[P]rivate plaintiffs often are unwilling to exercise the degree of self-restraint and 
consideration of foreign governmental sensibilities generally exercised by the U.S. 
Government.’” Empagran, 542 U.S. at 171 (alteration in original) (quoting Joseph P. Griffin, 
Extraterritoriality in U.S. and EU Antitrust Enforcement, 67 ANTITRUST L.J. 159, 194 (1999)). 
 245. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2894 n.12 (“The Commission’s enforcement 
proceedings . . . differ from private § 10(b) actions in numerous potentially relevant 
respects . . . .”); see also Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents 
at 12–13, Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869 (No. 08-1191), 2010 WL 719337 (“[T]he SEC’s enforcement 
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received greater support since passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street 
Reform and Consumer Protection Act,246 which amended the 
Exchange Act to expressly permit government agencies to bring 
securities-fraud cases premised on extraterritorial jurisdiction.247 
Anecdotally, this amendment—a response to Morrison248—supports 
the argument that, if Congress had to clarify its intent that a statute 
should operate differently for public actors than private actors, courts 
should adjust their interpretive guidelines accordingly. 
Nevertheless, this alternative proposal is imprudent, too. 
Ascribing Bowman’s lax prohibition on extraterritorial application to 
public actors does not resolve the difficulties associated with fair 
notice and assigning different statutory constructions to the same text. 
Moreover, it only exacerbates concerns regarding appropriate 
allocation of governmental authority, as more public agencies would 
enjoy the Bowman exception’s more easily surmounted presumption 
against extraterritoriality. 
Both the subject-matter-based and actor-based approaches to 
preserving the Bowman exception and distinguishing Morrison have 
at least anecdotal support in law. However, perpetuating the broad 
Bowman exception, in either the criminal or public-actor context, is 
not the best approach to clarifying the presumption against 
extraterritoriality. Although these alternative proposals impose 
distinctions that do not currently exist, they are quite literally 
distinctions without a difference: the presumption against 
extraterritoriality under either proposal would exhibit all of the same 
problems identified in this Note without offering marginal benefits. It 
would behoove courts to address the existing doctrinal inconsistencies 
by narrowing or abrogating the Bowman exception, rather than 
making an artificial distinction. 
 
activities are not limited by the additional constraints that apply to private suits. Unlike private 
plaintiffs, . . . the Commission is not required to prove that any investor actually relied on the 
misrepresentations or that the misrepresentations caused any investors to lose money. . . . The 
SEC has similarly broad and unqualified authority to bring an action for injunctive relief . . . .”). 
 246. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of the U.S. Code). 
 247. White, supra note 75, at 1228–29 (citing Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act § 929P(b)(2) (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (2012))). 
 248. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Extraterritoriality is a common and robust characteristic of U.S. 
law. Yet, no branch of government should ignore the consequences of 
the extraterritorial application of domestic law. Justice Brennan 
noted one scholar’s—assumedly tongue-in-cheek—observation that 
“our country’s three largest exports are now ‘rock music, blue jeans, 
and United States law.’”249 However, the Court has clearly stated and 
affirmed that such “legal exports” are not a given; sole domesticity is 
a hurdle to be surmounted only by clear legislative indication. 
For the reasons described—namely doctrinal coherence, smart 
allocation of government authority, and fair notice concerns—that 
hurdle should not be lower in the criminal context than in the civil 
one. Morrison provides a strong roadmap for construing 
geoambiguous statutes, and, although its precedent is currently 
binding only in the civil context, its principles and analysis should be 
extended to the criminal context, as well, thereby narrowing or 
abrogating the Bowman exception. Absent from the Bowman line of 
cases are persuasive reasons for relaxing the constraints of the 
presumption against extraterritoriality. That absence is problematic. 
And, in light of the reasons given in this Note, that absence should be 
fatal. 
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